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THE COMING REVOLUTION IN PUBLIC 
SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
Donald H. Wollett* 
D R. James Conant has commented on ·what he views as "concur-rent educational revolutions"-changes in methods of instruc-
tion, in curriculum emphasis, and in public school financing-which 
portend radical revision in the methods of determining educational 
policy.1 However, thus far neither Dr. Conant nor any other observer 
of similar stature has addressed himself seriously to a fourth educa-
tional revolution-in-the-making: the direct involvement of teachers, 
through structured collective negotiations, in the management of 
public elementary and secondary school systems. This Article will 
focus on that coming revolution. 
I. THE Locus OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY 
IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 
Local lay school boards and the superintendents who act as their 
chief executive officers function within prescribed fiscal limitations 
and are subject to peripheral legislative directives on such matters 
as minimum salaries, teacher retirement, and tenure.2 They are 
often motivated by the availability of federal and foundation grants, 
and are responsive to the requirements of regional accrediting 
agencies and the supervision of state boards of education and state 
superintendents. However, local boards and superintendents have 
a broad residual discretion to manage the public schools under their 
jurisdiction. "Within this wide domain of authority they are the 
principal makers and administrators of educational policy, carrying 
-0n the uniquely American tradition of decentralized "civilian" con-
trol of the public educational enterprise. 
Teacher organizations and teachers of education-the groups 
which together form "the educational establishment"3-historically 
have been able to exert heavy influence on state boards of education, 
• Professor of Law, University of California (Davis). A.B. 1941, University of 
Chicago; LL.B. 1942, University of Indiana. The author is a former partner in a law 
firm which served as labor counsel for the National Education Association.-Ed. 
1. J. CONANT, SHAPING EDUCATIONAL POLICY 2-8 (1964). 
2. See generally Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments and Public Employee 
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REV. 919 (1969). 
3. J. CONANT, supra note 1, at 16-48. 
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state superintendents, and regional accrediting agencies. They have 
effectively mounted and exerted "lobbying" pressures on state legis-
latures and, in recent years at least, on Congress. However, until very 
recently teacher organizations have had little involvement in local 
school administration or in the policy decisions of local school boards 
and superintendents. 
The triad of public school administration is that school boards 
make policy, superintendents administer policy, and teachers teach. 
Since the statement embodies some truth, it cannot fairly be charac-
terized as mythology. However, for one who is seeking a real under-
standing of who does what in the management and operation of a 
local school system, the statement is grossly misleading. The fact is 
that school boards frequently perform administrative as well as 
policy-making functions, usually in response to community pressures 
and often to the dismay of the local superintendents. For example, it 
is not uncommon for a school board to direct a change in the 
assigned textbook for a specific course. Moreover, superintendents 
often transcend their administrative roles in order to make educa-
tional policy. Many school board members, who know very little 
about the particulars of educational programming, are willing, if 
not relieved, to follow the judgment of professionally trained school 
superintendents on such matters as curriculum planning.4 
Not only do school boards and superintendents frequently get 
into each other's business, but they are also not reluctant to intrude 
themselves directly into the teaching process itself-often to the 
detriment of academic freedom.5 School boards and superintendents 
have considered it perfectly legitimate, for instance, to exercise strict 
control over the teacher's behavior, his method of instruction, or 
both. In part, this reflects the tradition of emphasizing the role of 
the teacher as an "employee" of the "community" to which the 
4. This observation is based upon a number of conversations which this writer 
has had with school board members. For example, during a conversation at the Con-
ference on Negotiations (California Teachers Association, Spring 1964) Mr. J. Edgar 
Benton of the Denver Board of Education stated: 
·we school board people are comfortable only when we are dealing with things 
with which we have had experience. We look forward to such agenda items as 
a bond issue or the purchase of a school bus for then we are on familiar terrain. 
If, on the other hand, the question before us involves educational programming, 
we are uneasy about our competence and willing, if not relieved, to follow the 
superintendent. 
5. When interviewed, one school board member in a New England state remarked: 
"Sure, we believe in academic freedom for our teachers. But this isn't New York. And 
that high school art teacher can't expect to get away with showing his class dirty pic-
tures by some off-beat Frenchman." 
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board and the superintendent are "responsible." Thus, teachers, indi-
vidually and collectively, are expected to tailor their expectations 
and behavior to fit the limits tolerable to the community in which 
they are employed-or, more precisely, to organized groups which 
have political leverage within that community. If the teachers exceed 
those limits, the school board and the superintendent will predictably 
stand with the community rather than with the faculty, even though 
the quality of education may suffer as a result. The rationale for 
choosing sides in this way is self-preservation: the community not 
only pays taxes to support the public educational establishment, but 
also retains the ultimate power to dismiss unresponsive boards of 
education and superintendents. Educational policy that is set in 
response to such pressure from community groups often does not 
satisfy the legitimate educational needs of the community's children.6 
II. THE PROFESSIONAL STATUS OF THE 
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER 
There has been a substantial effort in the United States to 
improve the quality of education by raising the requirements for 
admission to, and advancement in, the teaching profession. While 
some critics have argued that these standards are too parochial and 
too mechanical in conception and application,7 there is little doubt 
that the over-all effort has been successful. Teachers as a whole are 
now better qualified to serve the welfare of their special clientele 
than they have ever been before. We expect more from teachers today 
than at any time in the past, we assign them more responsibility, and 
we are more critical if their level of achievement-as measured by 
that of their students--does not reach our expectations. 
However, teachers do not have authority within local school sys-
6. Benton, Human Relations-Impasse-School Boards, in REPORT OF NORTHWEST 
INSTITUTE ON NEGOTIATIONS AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 253, 263 (Eastern Washington State 
College &: United States Office of Education 1968). 
Boards of Education are •.. in a sense, singularly unlikely to do the things 
that are necessary to lift public education on to the level of productive and 
efficient functioning and operations-particularly as far as finances are concerned 
-that they need to do. The reason for this is that they are so immediately 
subject to tax-payer revolts, tax-payer resistance, tax-payer opposition. "When 
given alternatives ••• between doing something that has to be done for the schools, 
••• or yielding to the concentrated and intense focus of pressure of certain vested 
interest groups in the community, they will opt not for education, but for the 
groups. Rationalizing it all the way on the theory that, "We are the elected 
representatives of people, and we have to find out what people think and then 
do just that." 
7. See J. CONANT, THE EDUCATION OF AMERICAN TEACHERS (1963). 
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terns commensurate with their responsibilities. They frequently lack 
a meaningful voice in determining the content of the courses they 
are teaching or in selecting appropriate textbooks. Often they are not 
free to formulate their own lesson plans or to modify them if they do 
not produce desirable classroom responses. Seldom, if ever, do they 
share a role in over-all curricular planning. A teacher who maintains 
rigorous performance standards £or his pupils or strict rules of eligi-
bility to participate in extracurricular activities £or which he is 
responsible may be supported by his school board in the teeth of 
parental complaints. But it is more likely that he will be forced to 
relax his standards under threat of an adverse performance rating, a 
transfer to the boondocks, or discharge. Teachers are frequently told 
that they should accept responsibility £or their colleagues who "beat 
the clock" or who are othenvise guilty of untoward behavior. Yet, 
teachers typically have no voice in recruiting new colleagues or in 
promotion and tenure decisions. The on-the-job freedom and au-
thority of classroom teachers has been seriously curtailed by standard-
ization of teaching procedures which are regimentally enforced.8 
Most teachers have inadequate office space (if indeed they have an 
office at all), and they have little or no secretarial help. Faculty 
libraries are virtually unknown. Teachers are seldom involved in 
decisions about the design or rehabilitation of physical plant or about 
the mix of technology and manpower to be employed in the teaching 
process. 
In short, teachers in public elementary and secondary education 
are the victims of a kind of one-dimensional professionalism: pro-
fessional responsibility without professional authority. It is as if one 
were to say to a doctor: "The health of the patient is in your hands, 
but someone else will make the diagnosis and prescribe the therapy." 
One prominent school board member has stated: 
I think the miracle is that we have extracted from the teachers corps 
of the United States the quality of performance that we have, given 
the conditions that we have subjected them to-a condition of gen-
eral servitude, I would describe it. They have lived in a condition 
where they were told what to do, when to do it, how to do it, and 
then excoriated for not having done the when, where, and how as 
8. THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE: EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA, REPORT V 
at 24 (Rockefeller Bros. 1958): 
Perhaps no profession has suffered such a general neglect of specialized 
abilities as that of the teacher. Teachers at the pre-college level tend to be handled 
as interchangeable units in educational assembly lines. The best teacher and the 
poorest in a school may teach the same grade and subject [using the same teach-
ing methods], use the same text book, handle the same number of students, get 
paid the same salaries, and rise in salary at the same speed to the same ceiling. 
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indicated. This is calculated, it seems to me, to squeeze the vitality 
out of almost anyone, except the vegetable-the guy who comes into 
teaching because he was a vegetable, and stays in it effectively because 
he is.9 
One junior high school teacher in a lower-middle-class neighbor-
hood in Brooklyn, frustrated that her performance is judged more on 
the basis of adherence to an approved lesson plan than on how much 
her students learn, expressed the misgivings of many professionally 
oriented teachers in urban school systems: 
I have a conflict between the right thing to do to get recognition 
[from the administration] and what I feel is the right thing to do 
[for the students] .... Teaching is really in a sense like a perfor-
mance. There ought to be more expressiveness and freedom in it .... 
Vvhat I really want is to be treated as a professional-to be consulted 
and trusted.10 
The specific conditions that this teacher complained about are not 
atypical in American education. Teachers must submit weekly lesson 
plans for the approval of supervisors who frequently do not even take 
the trouble to read them. Considerable time is devoted to minor 
clerical chores such as taking attendance, filling out forms, and keep-
ing records. Teachers are required to direct traffic in hallways be-
tween classes, and they are importuned never to sit down while 
teaching a class. Supervisors roam the halls during class changes and 
peer into classroom windows to enforce both of these rules strictly. 
Worse, the principal maintains an informal espionage system wherein 
teachers are encouraged to report on the activities of their fellow 
teachers by the prospect of relief from unwanted nonteaching duties 
such as cafeteria supervision.11 
III. THE HARBINGERS OF REVOLUTION 
Massachusetts,12 Michigan,13 New Jersey,14 New York,15 and 
Wisconsin16 have recently enacted general statutes requiring public 
9. Benton, supra note 6, at 265. 
10. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 4, 1965, at 1, col. 3. 
11. Id. 
12. MASS • .ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 178 (Supp. 1967). 
13. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.201-.216 (1967). 
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-1 to -11 (Supp. 1968), amending N.J. STAT • .ANN. 
§§ 34: 13A-1 to -13 (1959). 
15. N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The present version of 
this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective April 1, 1969), ap-
pears in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).) 
16. Wxs. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (municipal employees), §§ 111.80-.94 (state employees) 
(Supp. 1969). 
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employers, including school boards, to share their policy-making au-
thority with organizations of their employees, including teachers. 
Connecticut,17 Maryland,18 Rhode Island,19 and Washington20 have 
passed special laws guaranteeing teachers the right to organize and 
bargain collectively with school boards. Special statutes in Califor-
nia,21 Minnesota,22 and Oregon23 afford teachers the right to "meet 
and confer" with local school boards. Moreover, collective negotia-
tions between teacher organizations and local boards of education 
exist extralegally in seven other states which include such major 
cities as Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Kansas City, 
Denver, and Washington, D.C. One respected observer has estimated 
that by 1972 approximately eighty per cent of the nation's teachers 
will be teaching in states with some type of collective bargaining 
statute or in school districts with structured systems for collective 
negotiations.24 
During the last thirty years, collective bargaining in the private 
sector has profoundly influenced both the mode of managerial deci-
sion-making and the substance of management decisions. Power-shar-
ing between corporate executives and employee representatives is 
now commonplace. Employers who once jealously guarded their 
right to run their businesses unilaterally have resigned themselves to 
bilateral decision-making on such matters as compensation levels, 
fringe benefits, work loads, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment. Often these areas of shared decision-making impinge upon 
matters traditionally regarded as "management prerogatives" -for 
example, the decision whether to subcontract. However, as great an 
impact as the union movement has had in the private sector, few 
observers would characterize the changes in the mode of decision-
making as a managerial "revolution." Why, then, should one suppose 
that power-sharing in the public sector would have a different-and 
more profound-impact on management of the public educational 
enterprise? 
17. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 10-153(b) to (d) (Supp. 1969), §§ 10-153(e) to (f) (1967). 
18. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 175 (Supp. 1968). 
19. R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-9.3-1 to -5 (1969). 
20. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 41.56 (Supp. 1967). 
21. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13080 (West 1969). 
22. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.19-.26 (Supp. 1969). 
23. ORE. REv. STAT. § 342.450 (Supp. 1968). 
24. Lieberman, Collective Negotiations: Status and Trends, AM. SCHOOL BD. J., Oct. 
1967, at 7. 
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The answer lies in the aspirations and self-conceptions of teachers 
generally. Professors in higher education have traditionally aspired 
to the same degree of self-government that obtains in the entrepre-
neurial professions. Like lawyers and doctors, university professors 
have sought to establish their own criteria for admission into the 
profession and to fashion and enforce their own standards of good 
practice. Within the universities, they have pressed for effective influ-
ence in policy decisions on admission standards, curriculum content, 
degree requirements, grading standards, academic freedom, standards 
for student conduct and discipline, and procedures for the appoint-
ment of department chairmen, deans, and presidents. Furthermore, 
they have aspired to determine the conditions which affect the stan-
dards and quality of work performance-promotions, tenure, course 
assignments, work schedules, work loads, allocation of space, and 
secretarial help.25 
Teachers in elementary and secondary education do not yet fully 
share the same aspirations, probably because teaching at these levels 
is still not a sufficiently rewarding occupation to attract and hold the 
number of highly qualified persons necessary to achieve the level of 
"professionalism" found in higher education.26 Elementary and sec-
ondary school teachers' salaries are not yet competitive with salaries 
for other jobs involving comparable ability and length of training.27 
Promotional policy in most school systems is routine and depends 
more on seniority (or favoritism) than merit. Top salaries are not 
sufficiently far above the lowest salaries to constitute meaningful 
incentives for staying in the profession. Teachers with more than 
modest financial needs and responsibilities can solve their problems 
only by becoming administrators or by leaving education altogether.28 
It is significant to note in this regard that teachers have not been 
content to rest their case for salary increases on factors which are 
usually considered to be of prime importance in collective bargain-
ing generally-increases in the cost of living and comparisons with 
settlements and trends in other trades and occupations. Rather, their 
primary argument is that salary increases are necessary if the school 
25. See AMERICAN AssOCIATION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, TASK FORCE ON FACULTY 
REPRESENTATION AND ACADEMIC NEGOTIATIONS, FACULTY PARTICIPATION IN ACADEMIC 
GOVERNANCE 27-32 (1967). See also Brown, Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 
67 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 1067 (1969). 
26. THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE, supra note 8, at 23-26. 
27. Gardner, National Goals in Education, in GOALS FOR AMERICANS 18, 95-96 
(President's Commission on National Goals 1960). 
28. THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE, supra note 8, at 25-26. 
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district is to compete effectively in the market place for high-quality 
beginning teachers and for the continued services of experienced 
teachers. In the long run, they contend, this is the only way to reduce 
the number of substandard teachers. Turnover statistics thus assume 
critical importance in the bargaining process: How many teachers 
have resigned in the past five years? Why did they resign? Where did 
they go? Were they experienced or inexperienced? By whom were 
they replaced? Surprisingly, since they publicly proclaim their com-
mitment to excellence, many school boards are indifferent to such 
data. Such basic techniques of personnel management as conduct-
ing exit interviews to determine the causes of turnover are rare. 
Many school boards do not keep accurate and complete turnover 
statistics at all. Others do so, but only for the purpose of ascertaining 
how much money can be saved by replacing experienced teachers 
with inexperienced ones; this is accomplished by discharging every 
year a predetermined percentage of instructors who have not yet 
achieved tenure. 
In those school districts where it exists, collective bargaining has 
already made a significant impact on these conditions. As a result of 
the negotiations during the past five years, salaries and other com-
pensation levels have improved dramatically,29 and it is reasonable 
to expect that these trends will continue. Particular emphasis will 
probably be placed on widening the differential between top and 
bottom salaries in order to encourage "career" teachers to remain in 
the profession. As collective negotiation in education continues to 
improve entering salaries and salary expectations, not only will the 
number and quality of career teachers increase, but also the expecta-
tion levels and demands of teachers in elementary and secondary 
education will grow geometrically. Teachers will identify more and 
more with the "professional" objectives of their counterparts in 
higher education, and they will argue for a more significant role in 
the areas of managerial authority which have been occupied exclu-
sively by school boards and superintendents. 
Already the impact of this revolution has been felt in a number 
of school districts. The recent grievance arbitration of Barnstable 
Teachers Association v. Barnstable School Committee30 provides per-
haps the most dramatic illustration of the impact of collective nego-
29. For a discussion of the increase in teachers' salaries in Michigan, see Rehmus. 
supra note 2, at 924. 
30. EDUCATORS NEGOTIATING SERVICES, Dec. 2, 1968, case no. 1130-0043-68 (Fallon, 
arbitrator). 
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tiations on the division of managerial authority in public education. 
The aggrieved party, Edward F. Barry, had been employed as a high 
school chemistry teacher since 1959. Sixty-seven students had taken 
his course in college chemistry during the school year 1966-67; of 
these sixty-seven students, six per cent had received A's, and twelve 
per cent B's. At the other end of the scale, thirty per cent of the sixty-
seven students had received D's, and thirteen per cent F's. During 
the same marking period, students in other college preparatory 
courses in the school had been marked on a so-called normal curve: 
fourteen per cent of them had received A's, thirty-three per cent B's, 
nineteen per cent D's, and four per cent F's. Since the better colleges 
commonly regarded A's or B's as the only marks meriting college 
certification, eighteen per cent of Barry's students had received certi-
fying marks as compared with forty-seven per cent in other college 
preparatory courses in which students had been graded on the 
normal curve. 
The principal of the high school, Paul J. Prescott, received a 
number of parental complaints about Barry's grading system; he 
communicated these complaints to Barry and asked him to consider 
re-evaluating his marking system. While Barry did not foreclose this 
possibility, he stated his opinion that students had achieved lower 
grades in his chemistry class for two reasons: first, his standard for 
median achievement was a level sufficiently high so that students 
could compete successfully with students from other school systems 
who were seeking admission to Ivy League colleges; and second, 
some of the students who had been "assigned" to his class did not 
belong in a college chemistry class in the first place. 
When Barry subsequently refused to conform to the so-called 
normal marking curve, Prescott sent him a memorandum pointing 
out that for the past three years his distribution of marks had been 
out of conformity with marks received by college preparatory stu-
dents in other classes and from other instructors in the school. Ac-
cordingly, the principal ordered him "to revise your marking system 
to bring it into line with the marks received by college preparatory 
-students in other classes in the school."31 He also warned Barry that 
his failure to comply with this order would be regarded "as an act of 
insubordination.''32 Barry refused to comply with the order and filed 
a grievance under the arbitration machinery of the collective bar-
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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gammg contract between the teachers' association and the school 
committee. Article II of this agreement contained familiar language: 
"Except as otherwise provided in this agreement, the wages, hours, 
and other conditions of employment applicable on the effective date 
of this agreement shall continue to be so applicable unless there is 
good justification for a change."33 The arbitrator found that the 
method by which a teacher evaluates and grades his students is a 
condition of his employment. He further found that Barry had fol-
lowed his particular method of marking students based on examina-
tion results, homework, class participation, and lab work continu-
ously since his employment in 1959. Accordingly, the arbitrator found 
that it was a violation of article II for the school committee through 
its agent, Prescott, to direct Barry to revise his marking system in 
order to bring it into line with the normal curve used in other col-
lege ·preparatory classes. Thus, the arbitrator determined that Barry 
did not have to comply with the principal's order. 
Most faculty members in higher education would probably re-
gard this case as noteworthy only as an outrageous attempt by an 
antediluvian school administrator to interfere with a teacher's aca-
demic freedom. However, it will not be so regarded in elementary 
and secondary education. Educators' Negotiating Services, which re-
ports developments in collective negotiations in elementary and 
secondary education, reproduced this decision and sent it to its sub-
scribers with the following explanation: "This decision is likely to 
have repercussions because of its serious threat to the authority of 
principals to supervise and control the teaching activities of their 
teachers."34 Thus, what would be regarded as a threat to the author-
ity of teachers in higher education is regarded as a threat to the 
authority of principals in elementary and secondary education. 
The revolution in public school management is making its im-
pact felt in other areas traditionally regarded as the prerogatives of 
local school boards and administrators. Some recent collective agree-
ments negotiated between school boards and teacher organizations 
provide for teacher involvement in recruiting new faculty members. 
For example, one agreement in New York requires that teachers 
elected by their colleagues at the school, subject, or departmental 
level interview candidates for teaching positions during the recruit-
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
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ment process.35 Another teacher association in New York has pro-
posed in current negotiations that a teacher selection committee be 
established in each elementary school and in each department of each 
secondary school. Under this system, no new teacher could be em-
ployed without the approval of two thirds of the members of the 
appropriate teacher selection committee. Provisions such as these will 
have an important effect in shifting the balance of managerial au-
thority in favor of teachers and teacher organizations. 
Teacher organizations have also pressed for contractual provi-
sions outlining standards and procedures for judging the professional 
competence of nontenure teachers. For example, one agreement on 
Long Island provides for something akin to the "peer" group evalu-
ation of teaching ability which is commonplace in higher education. 
The contract specifically requires that any evaluation of a teacher's 
professional ability must include the judgment of a person of recog-
nized competence in the same field. Another teacher organization 
has proposed that "[n]o teacher shall be denied tenure unless such 
decision is approved by a vote of two-thirds of all of the members of 
the appropriate teacher or department selection committee." 
Other collective agreements contain provisions which are in-
tended to improve the quality of the educational program. For 
instance, several agreements in the New England area require the 
school administration to employ a certain number of specialists, 
such as psychologists, speech therapists, remedial reading teachers, 
and other personnel specially trained to improve the quality of edu-
cational services available to "different" children-those who are 
either disadvantaged or gifted. One agreement in Connecticut calls 
for the school board to employ a minimum of one hundred new staff 
members for the purpose of improving the quality of education in 
music, art, and courses for non-English speaking students. A Massa-
chusetts agreement provides for the establishment of a joint faculty 
committee which is charged, among other things, with the develop-
ment of plans for designing and equipping new and remodeled 
school facilities. 
Teacher involvement in the development of curriculum and 
other educational programs is increasingly common. One contract 
in New York calls for a faculty curriculum group in each school 
building, a curriculum committee to coordinate curricular offerings 
35. This, and the following examples, are drawn from agreements in which the 
author was the chief negotiator.-Ed. 
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from kindergarten through the twelfth grade, and a curriculum de-
velopment council to study and make recommendations on system-
wide curricular offerings and priorities. A contract in a different 
school system establishes a joint educational development committee 
for the purpose of establishing major programs, setting priorities, 
developing and implementing new curricular offerings, and evaluat-
ing both new and existing programs. Each faculty member on the 
committee is given released time from teaching chores to attend to 
his committee responsibilities. The same contract also creates sub-
ject matter councils at the district level, and curricular practice and 
te}f.tbook selection committees in each department of the secondary 
schools and at each grade level in the elementary schools for the 
purpose of coordinating curricular developments within the school 
system. 
At least two agreements on Long Island provide for the election 
of department chairmen by the members of each affected secondary 
school department. One teacher association is currently proposing 
the establishment of separate promotion committees in each school 
building as well as a district-wide promotion committee. Under this 
proposal, no person could be promoted to the chairmanship of a 
department without the approval of three fourths of the members of 
the committee in his building. Moreover, the person promoted 
would lose his new job during the second half of his third year of 
service unless the committee recommended his retention by a three-
fourths vote. The same procedures would apply to the selection of 
persons to fill district-wide promotional vacancies, including the 
superintendent's job. Implementation of the proposal would mean 
in effect, that a superintendent could not be selected without the 
approval of the teachers' representatives; moreover, a superintendent 
would be dismissed at the end of his third year unless the teachers 
agreed to his retention. 
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF ORGANIZED TEACHER INVOLVEMENT 
IN PUBLIC SCHOOL MANAGEMENT 
Faculty involvement in the decision-making process in the public 
schools can be expected to improve teacher salary levels, fringe bene-
fits, and working conditions with an attendant improvement in the 
quality of teachers. It should also produce improved supervision, 
modernization of personnel practices, more efficient management, 
and tighter budget-making procedures and budgetary control. More-
March 1969] Public School Management 1029 
over, teacher participation should substantially reduce the risk of 
political interference in local school management-hiring adminis-
trators or creating administrative sinecures on a patronage basis. 
Finally, it should result in a greater public awareness of what really 
goes on in the public schools. 
On the other side of the ledger, the shift in decision-making au-
thority may increase the risk that excellence in teacher performance 
-individual efforts that transcend established norms or deviate from 
standardized practice-will be discouraged or repressed in favor of 
uniformity of performance and equality of compensation. There 
may be increasing pressure for the use of mechanical or quantitative 
formulae under which, illustratively, equal hours of work plus equal 
seniority plus equal credits means equal pay. Collective bargaining 
inherently subjects many policy determinations to the rule of the 
organizational majority, and majority rule often reflects deep sus-
picion of individual initiative or advantage. Thus, collective nego-
tiations could have an adverse effect on teachers with special ability.36 
It is too early to predict, even tentatively, whether teacher par-
ticipation in the management of the public educational enterprise 
will result in more imaginative decision-making in curriculum 
planning, teaching methodology, and other aspects of educational 
programming in the public schools. The experience in higher educa-
tion does not support the belief that faculty "input" in such decision-
making processes necessarily produces salutary results. The push for 
innovation and experimentation in higher education often seems to 
come from the administration of the institution, typically in response 
to external pressures. Faculty resistance to change, if it occurs, may 
be the result of inertia or simply differing evaluations of the merits 
of particular proposals. 
State and national teacher organizations do devote a large per-
centage of their resources to research in ways to improve the quality 
of public education. It seems realistic to suggest that procedures for 
bilateral policy formulation through collective negotiations may 
prove to be an effective vehicle for encouraging the kind of work-
place involvement of teachers that is a sine qua non of effective 
experimentation. 
Most of the evidence in the early stages of the teacher revolution 
indicates that the cooperative development of educational policies by 
36. Of course, this can happen under the present relationships. See text accom-
panying notes 7-11 supra. 
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school boards, superintendents, and local teacher organizations will 
come slowly and with travail. Both parties can be expected to be 
doctrinaire and emotional in their respective positions on the ques-
tion of what subjects are bargainable, what subjects are managerial 
prerogatives, and what subjects are teacher prerogatives. Moreover, 
even when there is a disposition to cooperate, there may be conflicts 
of interest which make accommodations extremely difficult. For 
instance, an innovation-minded school board may wish to experi-
ment with a high school arranged on the model of Oxford College, 
with four separate "houses," each presided over by a "house master." 
Such a proposal requires the creation of several new jobs. The school 
board may subscribe abstractly to the principle that promotional 
vacancies should be filled from within the school system and that 
seniority should govern where the merit of several applicants is 
equal. Still, it may seek to describe the requirements for the new 
jobs so that senior teaching personnel, whom the board feels might 
lay the dead hand of tradition and orthodoxy on the experiment, 
could not qualify. The teacher organization, while it may lend its 
full support to the experiment in principle, may be compelled by 
the self-interest of its members to insist upon a job description which 
maximizes the chance that senior members of the incumbent staff 
will qualify for the new positions. This is particularly true since 
teachers, like other employees, commonly regard merit as a euphem-
ism for favoritism. 
Two other implications of organized teacher involvement in local 
public school management deserve brief comment. First, the fact 
that teachers by reason of their education, psychology, and traditions 
have an interest in the quality of the educational enterprise is rele-
vant in terms of avoiding or resolving bargaining impasses. Third-
party intervenors-mediators, fact finders, or arbitrators-will usu-
ally be in error if they cavalierly assume that proposals which 
manifest this interest are mere "window-dressing" for public beguile-
ment. This is not to say that all proposals of teacher organizations 
will be altruistic. But there will usually be a blend of self-concern 
and "professional" concern which is not characteristic of collective 
bargaining in many other fields. Every reasonable effort should be 
made to avoid retarding serious consideration of proposals which 
reflect professional concern over the quality of education on the 
ground that the issues are management prerogatives and therefore 
nonbargainable. Second, the development of strong local teacher 
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organizations will greatly increase the likelihood of visible conflicts 
between teachers and certain pressure groups within the community. 
Four years ago I made the following statement: 
[O]ne of the most serious problems facing urban schools today is 
the pressure generated by militant, well organized lay groups on 
school boards and superintendents. The most dramatic and ex-
plosive pressures (although not the only ones) arise from the conflict 
between groups who would achieve racial balance at the sacrifice of 
all other educational values and groups who think that the neigh-
borhood school principle was divinely ordained. The danger is that 
policies on such difficult and divisive matters will ultimately be 
made, not on the basis of carefully reasoned judgments by those 
persons who are responsible for the educational program, but on the 
basis of which group can out-demonstrate, out-litigate, and out-shout 
the other. What school boards and superintendents need, I suggest, 
is a countervailing force which will effectively offset such pressures 
and play a major role in keeping the development, formulation, 
and administration of school policy in responsible hands.37 
The pressure groups have different objectives today than they had 
when that statement was made. But the conflicts are just as severe, 
and the need for a countervailing force is just as great. A strong 
teachers' organization profoundly involved in public school manage-
ment can provide such a force. 
The current furor in New York City over "decentralization" or 
"community control" of the schools is a dramatic illustration of the 
point.38 The assertions by organized groups of parents-whether in 
Scarsdale or in Ocean Hill-Brownsville-that the neighborhood pub-
lic schools are "theirs" and that they must have total control over 
who is hired, what they teach, and what methods they use are 
squarely opposed to the highest aspirations of public school teachers. 
The pressure for community control being applied by the leader-
ship of racial and ethnic groups in the affected neighborhoods merely 
compounds the conflict. If teaching is truly a profession, teachers 
must be recognized as having a special competence to help define 
the standards of their "practice" and the quality of service provided 
to their "clientele." 
The history of public education seems to indicate that neither 
37. Address by Donald H. Wollett, Spring Field Conference, University of Southern 
California, March 10, 1965. 
38. See Mayer, The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, The 
Teacher's Union and the Teachers Strikes of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 6 
(Magazine), at 18. 
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school boards nor other essentially political agencies, standing alone, 
can realistically be relied upon to provide a meaningful domain of 
academic freedom for public school teachers. Teachers can achieve 
this objective only through the development of strong local organiza-
tions which are capable of mobilizing and using power in appro-
priate ways. Such teacher organizations can give school boards caught 
between the needs of education and the pressures of public interest 
groups the courage and confidence to "opt" for education. Where 
teacher organizations and school boards are able to engage in con-
structive collective bargaining, public school management will in-
deed be revolutionized in ways which hold great promise for im-
provement of the educational enterprise. 
